A Comprehensive Review of The Kansas Open Records Act

The Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) employs decades of accumulated administrative laws in order to regulate the entirety of the state government (and its partners) in their responses to private citizens' impassioned requests for public records, all in service of its lofty, yet valiant goal of transparency in government. In the absence of compiled data regarding KORA’s financial impact on the State, this review looks to the language of the laws, public comment, and alternative formulas for open government to ascertain if KORA truly suffers insufficiencies that justify reform and anticipate what that change could look like.

In law, KORA is fairly simple. The act establishes a broad policy of open government across all public agencies in the State of Kansas. Under KORA, any person may request access to public records in the possession of any public agency and be entitled to a response from the government no later than three business days after the agency receives the request. Agencies are able to charge fees to mitigate the cost of responding to the request. Agencies must disclose requested records unless the requested content is exempt from disclosure under KORA. If a person believes that their request was improperly denied, they may sue the offending agency in court to obtain a court order forcing the agency to disclose the record and endure other penalties. Occasionally, the attorney general investigates potential violations of KORA, and decides if a violation occurred. The attorney general’s decisions help to set expectations for how each agency should comply with KORA  and may also help clarify ambiguities in the law.

In practice, KORA is much more complex. Members of the press and journalistically motivated constituents have found their research stymied by prohibitive fees, making their civic engagement “pay to play”. Concurrently, agency heads watch in dismay as the burden created by incessant responses to overbroad and ambiguous requests eats away at their already limited pool of resources. Meanwhile, back at the farm, The attorney general’s office has struggled to maintain consistent standards of enforcement even within its own walls, granting agencies carte blanche to defer their KORA responsibilities like no one is watching. These confluent factors serve as a catalyst for harsh criticism of a law that once had wide-reaching support. As disenchantment grows, these factors may serve as a catalyst for something else- reform.

For a blueprint, this review must look no further than the legislative past of House Bill 2599. Introduced in the Kansas House last year and subsequently given short shrift, this piece of legislation boasted handy solutions to the crisis of unnecessary fees and requests that now imperils KORA. However, despite the unparalleled excellence of this great state, other state’s open record models may also help to inform future reform with a greater understanding of how the language of the law effects the landscape of a state’s regulatory scheme. This review looks to our neighbors- Missouri, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Nebraska for friendly advice, because perhaps somewhere between Colorado’s criminal enforcement of the law, and Oklahoma’s broad prohibition on exorbitant fees, a new and better statute may be born.

THE KANSAS OPEN RECORDS ACT IN LAW

1.      Introduction

Transparency is a crucial value for any governmental institution in a democratic society. The capacity for a private citizen to engage in and supervise the functions of governmental institutions is paramount to an engaged citizenry and resilient trust in those institutions. The American value for transparency in government is rooted in its foundational history. In the wake of the Revolutionary War and the early days of the new Republic, James Madison noted that “In such a government… where members are so removed from the eye of their constituents, an easy and prompt circulation of public proceedings is peculiarly essential.”¹ Even in a comparatively simple debate about postage, Madison knew that public trust was a crucial component in a representative democracy  and one that is inextricably linked to public access to government happenings.

Two centuries and some change later, transparency remains a pertinent government interest and a subject of immense controversy in the public sphere. In the wake of the presidential election of 2020, allegations of voter fraud and manipulation placed the opacity of government records in a position of unique political potency. To combat skepticism of fair practices, counties placed in particular controversy have spent extensively, with one Arizona county debuting a refurbished election headquarters complete with floor to ceiling windows and a price tag of $32 million.² Despite sweeping efforts to rehabilitate its image, public trust in the government remains at an all-time low, with only 22% of surveyed Americans saying they believe the government will do the right thing most of the time.

In Kansas, these conflicts persist. While reactive efforts like Governor Kelly’s initiative to publish detailed reports on public fund expenditure ³ and unusual requirements for disclosure of bill authors⁴  have attempted to address some voter concerns regarding transparency, the Sunflower State must still come to grips with fundamental flaws in its regulation of open government that predate novel controversies. In order to address and alleviate concerns of public faith, Kansas must ensure that its transparent distribution and visibility of public records fosters public trust and serves those who need it well. This review seeks to give an overview of the statutory structure of KORA, review the impact and shortcomings of the statute in its current implementation, and analyze proposed solutions and comparable laws in other jurisdictions. In order to earn the trust of the public, Kansas must first understand where and how it is falling short.

2.      Method and Scope of Review

            Ironically, the state-collected data on KORA is limited as record requests are fulfilled by the record holder, and the record of their fulfillment across agencies is not a public record subject to request. There is no public centralized source for data collected on the types and amount of requests or the agencies that requests are most frequently served by. Thus, this review is limited to analysis of narrative sources in the yearly attorney general KORA complaint reports and legislature testimony, coupled with analysis of the statutory language. This review seeks to compare issues isolated in such sources to outline sources of conflict embedded in the current statute and consider possible changes as proposed by the legislature or implemented in separate jurisdictions.

            Specifically, this review seeks to analyze pressing issues with the current KORA statute in the context of modern shifts in technology and ideology to assist the legislature in determining if the act is in need of a comprehensive update. This review considers controversy regarding copying fees, administrative burden,  and attorney general enforcement in the context of constituent testimony, instances of KORA enforcement and the governing statute. In its analysis of the meaningful impacts of the statutory language, this review seeks to illuminate a meaningful understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the current KORA and isolate reforms that may be yet to come..

3.      Overview of The Kansas Open Records Act (KORA)

The Kansas Open Records act (KORA) establishes a broad policy of open government in Kansas. Enacted in by the Kansas Legislature in 1984, the act provides that all public records are open for inspection by any person, unless specifically exempted by law.⁵⁶ KORA applies to all state and local government agencies including executive agencies, legislative bodies, and judicial entities⁷. It also covers entities acting on behalf of a public agency or performing a governmental function. Any person can request access to public records by submitting a request to the appropriate agency, provided the requestor has a "laudable object to accomplish or a real and actual interest in obtaining the information”⁸. Agencies must respond to KORA requests "as soon as possible" but no later than three business days after receiving the request. Agencies can charge fees for providing copies of records but these fees must be reasonable and based on a

tual costs.

  The response can include granting access, denying the request for an exemption, or seeking clarification or additional time if needed. KORA includes several exemptions that allow agencies to withhold certain records. If a record request is denied because an agency claims that requested content is subject to an exemption or privilege, the requestor may either file a complaint with the state attorney general or bring a suit in the state trial court⁹. Upon receiving a complaint, the state attorney general will review the exception claimed in light of the relevant statute, make a determination, and in cases of need issue an enforcement action. Often, the state attorney general will publish a yearly report of KORA complaints received by the office and the administrative action taken in response. In a suit brought in state court, the court will review the action and may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, as well as an injunction to mandate disclosure of the requested records if appropriate.

4.      Legislative History of Open Records In Kansas

            The development of Open Records laws in Kansas is a storied history of prescriptive statutory solutions to existing problems. Prior to statutory regulation, the right to access records developed as a mere concept implied and relied on in various court decisions. The public right to access records was codified in 1957 with statutory regulation that granted public access to those records required to be kept¹⁰. The negative framing of this statute allowed for those records not required to be kept to be closed to the public. This negative framing also allowed for messy litigation about what records were required to be kept. In 1984, the legislature enacted the current statute to shift the burden and create a presumption that all records were subject to public inspection, except those designated an exception by statute. The KORA has since been amended to add new exceptions and definitions to further specify the reach of the presumptive open records in Kansas¹¹.

5.      “Public Agencies” for the purpose of KORA

KORA applies broadly to any public agency, as defined within the law. For the purposes of KORA, a public agency refers to the state, or .. any office, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any other entity receiving public funds¹². This broad definition, consistent with KORA’s broad presumption of availability, applies to most public institutions, although its application varies across each type of public body.

A.    Executive Branch

KORA applies broadly to the Kansas Executive Branch offices because they receive tax dollars. Records of individual members of each agency are not subject to KORA unless they are records of the agencies that they serve. KORA does not create a burden for each member of Public Agencies to personally maintain records created in performance of their duties, but requires that the requester obtain said records from the Agency’s central office¹³.

B.     Legislative Branch

Legislative bodies are subject to KORA in the same way. Each legislator is not personally responsible for producing records maintained in performance of their duties. While the Legislature may contain wildly varying records consistent with its diverse range of opinions and policies, requesters must nonetheless seek such records from the Legislature’s central office¹⁴

C.    Judicial Branch

In a similar way, Courts are subject to KORA while individual judges are not. KORA’s definition of a “Public Agency” expressly excludes any municipal judge, district court judge, .. or justice of the Supreme Court. The telephone records of Judges are also not subject to KORA.¹⁵ In all the above instances, the personal products of individuals employed by public agencies are not subject to inspection, but the records they produce on behalf of the agency are subject to a KORA request through the central office.

D.    Instrumentalities

KORA also extends to nongovernmental entities that receive, expend, or are supported in whole or part by public funds¹⁶. This means that private entities enlisted to serve traditional public functions are subject to KORA. Private entities are subject to KORA when they are considered an “instrumentality” for advancing a public goal through their receipt of public funds. When contested, the classification of an entity as an “instrumentality” is a question of law for the Court or the State Attorney general. Here, a Kansas Supreme Court decision regarding private hospitals is instructive on when entities become instrumentalities. In 2018, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a not-for-profit hospital that receives public funds was an instrumentality because a significant goal of the hospital was to fulfill services desired by the voters of the county¹⁷. By contrast, a living facility that provided care for 8-12 people living with developmental disabilities is not subject to KORA because the majority of funds received were paid by clients who were receiving services¹⁸. Generally, an entity is not an instrumentality if it mostly provides services for its customers rather than a larger public good. Despite the numerous rulings on individual cases, the application of whether an entity's private enterprise outweighs its public good remains a case by case determination.

6.      Content Subject to KORA

KORA applies broadly to records made, maintained or kept by or in possession of any public agency or any employee of a public agency ¹⁹.  This wide reaching rule creates a broad presumption of inclusion that allows the law to apply to any form and type of record. This definition of public records is inclusive of a variety of mediums including but not limited to: Telephone call logs, metadata records, text messages, social media posts, and information maintained on computer facilities.²¹

While the content included is vast, it is not limitless. The KORA does not require a public agency to answer questions asking for the agency to conduct research. It also does not require a public agency to create records to respond to a KORA request.²². The law does not require agencies to retain extensive records, but just requests that records are kept at a rate consistent with the minimum record retention schedules set forth by the State Records Board. Through these limitations, the scope of a KORA request is typically limited to records that would likely be within the agency’s possession.

In 2016, the Legislature expanded the definition of open records to clarify that private communications of any officer or employee of a public agency made “pursuant to the officer's or employee's official duties and which is related to the functions, activities, programs or operations of any public agency” are subject to KORA²³. The amendment intended to apply KORA to the private email accounts of state employees when such emails are used to do their public jobs and avoid instances where emails regarding state business fell outside of the scope of KORA²⁴. This shift expanded the broad reach of KORA to private citizens’ use of communication provided that such communication was deployed in service of their public jobs. Now, through this broad application of KORA, government workers’ private devices may become subject to KORA when they use it for their work.

7.      Content Excluded from KORA

            KORA provides a list of 55 statutory exceptions to its broad reaching position of availability of public records. By amendment in 2019, all exceptions added in 2000 must be reviewed within 5 years or they automatically sunset. All exceptions, outside of one regarding confidentiality requirements, are discretionary meaning that agencies can choose to invoke an exception in denying a request but may choose to disclose a record that might fall under an exception when its disclosure would not create liability for the agency. Exceptions range from those consistent with disclosure prohibitions by Federal and State statute or rules of evidence to exceptions in the interest of public schools testing²⁵. A complete and exhaustive list of each of these 55 exceptions can be found in the bill ²⁶.

            One more complex exception found in the bill is an exception governing the disclosure of criminal investigation records. This is the only record request that must go through the court prior to admission.  Here, the district court may order disclosure only when such disclosure satisfies a lengthy list of conditions. To be considered for disclosure, the inspection of a criminal investigation record must be in the public interest, and such disclosure must not interfere with future law enforcement action, reveal the identity of any confidential source or undercover agent, or reveal confidential investigation techniques or procedures. Furthermore, such disclosures must not endanger the life or physical safety of any person, and must not reveal the private information of any victim of any sexual offense.

            In addition to listed statutory exceptions, KORA disclosure is also subject to any other statute that restricts disclosure of documents. For example, an attorney general Opinion in 1983 held that state law requiring the confidentiality of information gathered by bank commissioners in their investigation of banks superseded KORA’s presumption of open records and was a functional restriction on KORA²⁷. Thus, while KORA’s list of exceptions is lengthy, it is not exhaustive and continues to be subject to future lawmaking.

8.      Enforcement of KORA

Two types of civil claims serve as enforcement mechanisms for KORA violations. When a KORA request is denied by an agency, the requestor may choose to file a complaint with Kansas District Court. Any person aggrieved by a violation of KORA may file such a suit, does not need assistance of an attorney, although they may lose attorney’s fees as an available remedy should they choose to do so²⁸. A person may bring a suit to mandate the disclosure of documents at any time but must bring their suit within three years if they are seeking any additional relief like Attorney’s fees or fines²⁹. When a requester files suit in District Court against an agency for a KORA violation, that agency has the burden of proof to demonstrate that their denial of the KORA request was proper. To uphold their denial, an agency must prove by the preponderance of evidence that the record requested was properly denied under a KORA exemption³⁰. This burden shifts in civil suits for failure to disclose criminal investigation records, where the plaintiff assumes the burden to prove that disclosure would be in the public interest³¹. If the requester prevails, the Court may enter a judgment requiring disclosure of the requested document, and also award court costs and attorneys fees to the requestor. In certain cases, the court may also order the agency to complete KORA training as prescribed by the attorney general. Litigants unhappy with their results may appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals, and apply for review under the Kansas Supreme Court. All appeals must be filed not more than thirty days after the initial final judgment.

Conversely, jilted requestors may choose to file their complaint with the state attorney general. By decree of an amendment enacted in the Kansas Legislature in July of 2015, The attorney general, upon receipt of a KORA complaint, may investigate and take legal action against alleged violations of KORA. The attorney general will find a violation of KORA when the preponderance- or majority- of evidence demonstrates a violation occurred. When the attorney general finds a violation, they may enter into a consent order with the agency accused. A consent order is a joint agreement between the attorney general and the responsible members of the public agency, that typically asks the Agency to admit the circumstances surrounding their KORA violation and undergo training efforts and civil penalties in order to avoid litigation in the District Court³². If the Agency does not enter into a consent order, the attorney general may issue a finding of violation and then apply to the district court for enforcement. Upon review, the District Court will enforce the attorney general’s decision, if they find that there was no abuse of discretion made in the finding.

THE KANSAS OPEN RECORDS ACT IN PRACTICE

1.      Introduction

            The KORA’s application in practice is burdensome, nuanced, and not without its controversies. Each agency in question is constantly responsible for the retention of their records in a way that is consistent with the minimum record retention schedules set forth by the State Records Board³³. In addition, each agency must be able to promptly process and address record requests within the statutory time limit of 3 days. Requests can be broad and content heavy, requiring large hours of labor to redact confidential information. The fees that public agencies charge to fulfill requests have been under scrutiny by those who view it as a limit on access to public records. By contrast, Agencies claim that serial requesters may overload their administrative capacity and argue that reasonable fees are fair and necessary to ensure that taxpayers don’t foot the bill. Finally, the role of the attorney general in enforcement of KORA violations has come under scrutiny. For these issues and more, wide ranging data is fairly inaccessible as agencies do not report each request that they receive. As such, this review is limited in its aggregate data, but looks at case by case reports such as attorney general reports and congressional testimony to isolate instances of controversy in light of the enforcement of KORA.

2.      Calculation and Enforcement of KORA Fees

            KORA allows public agencies to charge reasonable fees for their fulfillment of record requests, and fees perceived to be unreasonable may be disputed. Fees are determined by the head of each agency. Fees for requests on the judicial branch are bound by the Supreme Court rules. Fees for requests on the legislative branch are set by the legislative coordinating council³⁴. Fees may not exceed the actual cost of furnishing records, including staff time³⁵. Fees for accessing records maintained on computer facilities must only include the cost of computer services, as well as staff time³⁶. Any person requesting records may appeal the reasonableness of the fees charged for providing access to or furnishing copies of such records to the secretary of administration, whose decision shall be final³⁷. A fee that is equal to or less than $.25 per page is presumed to be reasonable. External to these basic guidelines, public agencies are granted broad discretion to determine fees charged on a request-by-request basis. In practice, fees charged for KORA requests can vary wildly.

A.    Considerations in calculation of KORA Fees

            Public Agencies are granted fairly broad discretion to calculate fees charged for KORA requests. Generally, KORA fees are comprised of the actual cost of copying documents, in addition to staff time at the rate of pay for each person whose time will be used in responding to the request in question³⁸. Fees for requests for electronic records are limited to  the costs of staff time in rendering computer services. Agencies may require that requestors pay KORA fees in advance of receiving requests³⁹. While the fee calculation process seems fairly straightforward, controversy persists in the calculation and assessment of fees.

B.     Public Concern Regarding KORA Fees

            Opponents of the current KORA fee structure argue that exorbitant KORA fees are often levied as a tool to prevent public inquiry when an agency does not wish to comply. Members of the media have expressed concern that KORA fees increase the financial burden on journalistic institutions already burdened by low budgets and overworked staff.  In a proponent testimony in 2024, Journalist Rachel Schrag Sommerfield of KSNW-TV Wichita described her experience and difficulty in funding relevant requests⁴⁰. In 2018, Anthony Bunn, a 2-year-old child from Wichita, died at the hands of his mother and her boyfriend. Upon learning that the Department for Children and Families had been involved prior to the child’s death, Sommerfield’s team filed a KORA request with the DCF to investigate their actions prior to the boy’s death. They were quoted with an estimate of $493 in advanced KORA costs for the printing of 552 pages of documents that, upon receipt, contained 354 pages that were either completely blank or entirely redacted

 Another KORA service at the same institution, led DCF to fabricate records to describe agency action in a child endangerment case that never happened. Journalistic frustration with KORA fees is not isolated to her institution, Sommerfield notes, as she recalls colleagues who had detailed instances where they were quoted a shocking $8,586 to retrieve files kept in Hutchinson, KS. Others recalled agencies charging a standard $50+ fee for agencies to check and see if they possessed responsive documents. Sommerfield notes that fees have become so burdensome that many journalistic institutions share the burden of KORA fees to make larger requests possible. Emily Bradbury of the Kansas Press Association, along with Allison Mazzei of the Kansas Association of Broadcasters argue that the problem lies with the lack of regulatory standards for the charging and execution of staff labor⁴¹. Citing an instance where the City of Frontenac billed requestors in excess of $3,000 for a records request due to outsized attorney’s fees.  Bradbury and Mazzei argue that lack of regulation allows for agencies to overcharge in ways that are prohibitive to the transparency that KORA attempts to provide. Sommerfield and others argue that the immense burden of outsized KORA fees have a chilling and prohibitive effect on important journalistic inquiry into matters of immediate public concern.

This concern is not limited to journalist institutions as private citizens have voiced their concerns of disenfranchisement at the hands of overbroad KORA fees. Debbie Detmer of Shawnee noted, in her proponent testimony in 2024, that she received a $500 advance fee for a report that was entirely digital⁴². She argues that reports that are accessible at the click of a button should not procure such large costs. Other citizens, like Jill O’Connor, see levied fees as a threat designed to deter fair requests for open and transparent government⁴³. Independent researchers assessed with fees in excess of 5 cents per digital page argue that such charges are fabricating expenses when none exist⁴⁴. Fees for independent researchers can vary wildly and reach tremendous heights. Thad Snider, a private citizen and constituent, detailed his personal struggles in accessing videos of the local election drop box and noted a particularly egregious example where the GOP Chairman’s KORA request fielded an advance cost quote of fifty five thousand dollars with an estimated wait time of five years.⁴⁵ Thad and others argue that such exorbitant fees make filing KORA requests as a private citizen virtually pointless as they voice their disillusionment with the process.

      D. Does KORA Need a Digital Update?

Due to KORA’s enactment in 1984 and meager updates since, many question if the statute is far too antiquated to evaluate the true cost of producing a public record in the new world of rapid tech growth and innovation. The perception that records could be a mere click away from disclosure with some minor changes to the way the bill interacts with tech fuels the belief of constituents like Debbie Detmer that digital production fees are simply manufactured to deter requests. This perception fundamentally misunderstands the nature of digital disclosure under KORA. Under the current statute fees for electronic records exclusively include the cost of computer services and staff time alone⁴⁶. This means that, per the law, public agencies are already prohibited from charging copying fees for digital records. Therefore, fees for digital production, like the one sustained by Debbie Detmer, are simply appropriate collections to subsidize the administrative cost of searching, reviewing, redacting, and responding to such a request. If a public agency, in their discretion, decided to grant broad access to certain digital records, they may establish a computer system allowing access to public records on a paid subscription basis⁴⁷, but such programs do not account for the specialized search and review process necessary to fulfill particular requests, and do not indict the validity of the fees necessary to sustain those processes. While organization in record collection will surely evolve as innovation continues, the modern statute appropriately recognizes the reduction in copying cost of digital requests, while sustaining agencies’ ability to recoup for the nuanced costs incurred through fulfilling digital requests.

Government Response To Public Concerns Regarding KORA Fees

            The agencies and administrators charged with regulation of KORA have taken substantial steps to mitigate the concerns isolated by the constituents above. The Kansas Department of Administration issued a memo in 2022 to attempt to standardize fees across public agencies. It opines that agencies review one record request (per requesters) in a twelve month period for free, provided the request can be produced with less than one hour of staff time and consists of no more than twenty five pages⁴⁸. The memo outlines standardized rates for print copies and limits staff time expense to $60 per hour, and requires that overestimated fees be refunded so as to not exceed the actual cost to furnish the requested documents. Through standardizing rates, the office hopes to provide more strict guidance on how KORA fees may be calculated.

            The attorney general’s office has also taken action to draw a hard line against outsized KORA fees. In the City of Frontenac case referred to in Emily Bradbury’s testimony, the AG ruled that the excessive fees were a violation of KORA and issued extensive enforcement action to prevent future violations. In his enforcement action, then-Attorney General, Derek Schmidt required that the city cease and desist from future violations, review their existing policy, and attend substantial remedial training while providing a written report of compliance to ensure that the city made meaningful steps towards equitable enforcement of KORA. Such decisions are a hefty stick that may serve as a deterrent against agencies seeking to overcharge in hopes of eliminating requests altogether.

3. The Administrative Burden of KORA

A. Considerations in KORA Capacity

            The enforcement of KORA creates a substantial administrative burden on the public agencies that it governs. Prompt and adequate response to requests requires the creation of new facilities and chains of communication within agencies that are frequently strapped for cash, and whose increased expenditure would be a burden borne by their taxpayers. Each KORA request must be fielded and issued a response no later than three business days after its receipt, creating an ongoing duty for agencies to check and respond to requests⁴⁹. In complying with this KORA, Agencies have an affirmative duty to designate a local freedom of information officer who is charged with taking measures to ensure the agency complies with KORA’s broad interest in the availability of public documents. Furthermore, an official custodian of the agency must prominently display or distribute or otherwise make available to the public a brochure in the form prescribed by the local freedom of information officer that contains basic information about the rights of a requestor⁵⁰. Agencies must retain records in consistency with the Preservation act, and many must establish extensive storage for this purpose. An agency may refuse a public record request if the request places an unreasonable burden in producing public records or if the custodian has reason to believe that repeated requests are intended to disrupt other essential functions of the public agency⁵¹. If an agency claims this exception they must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the record request would in fact place an unreasonable burden upon their administration⁵².

B. Public Discourse Regarding KORA Capacity

            While members of the public and media argue that KORA fee’s have a deterrent effect on meaningful requests, members of public agencies argue that deterrent fees are their only protection from an influx of overbroad requests on their already under-equipped administrative capacity. Clayton Barker, Deputy Secretary of State, noted that open record requests have become a tool used to disrupt the operations of election offices. He notes that his office handles over ten thousand record requests for business services per year, with most requests being fulfilled entirely free of charge. The office also handles around 750 election centric requests for a fixed fee. The remaining 150 requests are handled by one staff member of the agency, where only one request has resulted in a KORA fee charge. Barker continues to note many requests are overbroad and burdensome, such as requests for every email communication between named staff members over the course of four years. He argues that these types of outsized requests place an impossible burden on their understaffed agency⁵³. Jay Hall, of the Kansas Association of Counties, argued in his 2024 legislative testimony that KORA fees are essential to deter requests that are incredibly time consuming to staff⁵⁴. Amanda Stanley, of the City of Topeka, concurred with her fellow public service members as she noted that her office fielded multiple requests for all electronic communications by a public officer over a broad period of time- requests that may require an estimated staff time between six and one hundred and ninety hours⁵⁵. She notes that her city has already discounted staff time, with attorney time for KORA response billed at $35 per hour, and that most requests are fielded from out of state media. Stanley argues that underfunded requests from out of state requesters are particularly problematic because they strain already limited staff capacity and leave Kansas taxpayers to foot the bill. Testimony from Michael Koss and Dick Carter of The City of Overland Park place the scope of requests in perspective, as they note that their office fielded several requests that would require the production of over fifteen thousand emails including intimate details of juvenile victims⁵⁶. Sensitive requests like those containing protected information about minors require substantial work hours to fulfill, as the agency must devote significant time to redacting sensitive info and frequently will have to hire an attorney to determine questions of privilege. The sensitive and broad sweeping nature of some requests can dramatically increase the administrative burden posed by the KORA statute.

C. Government Response to Concern Regarding KORA Burden

The State Government holds three types of assistance to help alleviate the administrative burden borne by Agencies: fees, budget, and exemptions. KORA fees allow for agencies to recoup the cost of broad and burdensome requests through proportional fees charged in advance of producing requested documents. KORA fees may also be deployed to limit the scope of requests, as many agencies note overbroad requests tend to refine their requests after receiving their fee quote. The State Government may also factor agencies’ KORA burden into their budget allocation, and provide sufficient resources to handle additional requests. In a 2023 budget hearing, Attorney General Kris Kobach referenced his office’s KORA burden in an appeal for increased funding to this effect⁵⁷. Finally, the legislature may, at its discretion, choose to enact new exemptions to protect against record requests in particular areas that may be overbroad, burdensome, or sensitive to produce. Exceptions provide grounds for immediate denial of claims under their purview and, as such, entirely relieve the administrative burden of those claims. Any such exception is typically subject to a sunset provision imbued in the bill⁵⁸.

4. attorney general Enforcement

A. Considerations In attorney general Enforcement of KORA

In Kansas, the attorney general inhabits a crucial and often controversial role in KORA enforcement. Following a legislative change in 2015⁵⁹ The attorney general may choose to investigate KORA complaints from jilted requesters and, where appropriate, make a finding of a violation. Upon such a finding, the attorney general will either enter into a consent order with the public agency or issue a finding of violation in district court. A consent order is a mutual agreement between the attorney general, the head of the public agency, and any officers found to have violated KORA, and it can include some substantial reprimands. Such an order may require the agency to admit fault, complete training approved by the attorney general, forfeit up to $250 for each violation, and establish a plan to reform the agency into KORA compliance⁶⁰. If the agency refuses the consent order, the attorney general may nevertheless issue a finding of violation, which carries heftier penalties. Upon a finding of a violation, the AG may require agencies to comply with KORA, complete approved training, and forfeit $500 for every violation⁶¹. In either case, the attorney general will submit their findings to the District Court, which will enforce the reprimands, if they do not believe the AG has made them unfairly⁶². In addition, Due to the limited oversight of their KORA decisions, and the broad impact thereof, the attorney general’s office wield’s broad discretion to set the standard for enforcement of KORA through its action and/or inaction in varied circumstances. These decisions vary broadly across differing administrations bringing heightened scrutiny of the office’s role in public records, as well as their own KORA disclosures and claimed exemptions.

B. Public Discourse Regarding attorney general Enforcement of KORA

            Following its rise to KORA power in 2015, the attorney general’s office has remained a lightning rod for political discourse and discussion regarding the earnesty of Kansas’s commitment to open government. As both an enforcement mechanism of KORA and a public agency subject to KORA itself, the attorney general office largely sets the tone and standard for the entire bureaucracy’s compliance. The office’s actions, as a result, suffer heightened scrutiny from its peers and constituents. Since 2015, two administrations have occupied the attorney general office: Derek Schmidt, who served from 2011 to 2023, and Kris Kobach who has occupied the office since 2023. During their respective tenures, both were subject to controversy regarding their enforcement of the KORA.

            In 2017, Schmidt’s office fell under fire for its denial of journalist Morgan Chilson’s request for all KORA requests received over a certain period of time. Editor Tomari Quinn, upon discovering Chilson’s correspondence, argued that the office’s correspondent (notably Cheryl Whelan: the director of open government training and compliance) issued a response rife with fundamental misunderstandings of the KORA⁶³. Specifically, Whelan’s response falsely claimed that Chilson had not filed their request with reference to KORA and failed to disclose a date where the record would be available. This is particularly problematic, Quinn argues, because Chilson had titled her email as a KORA request, demonstrating a disconnect between the response and the initial request. In addition, the responses failure to provide an exact date and time for availability of the records is a plain violation of KORA, which requires a detailed explanation for delay in record production complete with the estimated date and time of availability.⁶⁴

            The remainder of Schmidt’s tenure continued to suffer questions of discretion in his office’s enforcement of the KORA. In 2018, the office sustained criticism for its finding that four instances where agencies had failed to include a date of production in their KORA response had not violated the KORA despite their plain-faced diversion from the expectations listed in the law⁶⁵.  In 2022, Schmidt’s office endured criticism, at the hands of First Amendment legal scholar and KORA activist Max Kautsch, for their three month delay in claiming an exception to Kautsch’s request for once-public documents detailing the office’s interpretation of KORA. Kautsch argued that the office’s removal of said documents is particularly concerning due to substantial evidence indicating the office’s inconsistent interpretation of the law: referring specifically to a training video instructing agencies to simply delay requests in order to maintain compliance.⁶⁶ 

            Where Schmidt’s tenure and relationship with KORA was characterized by heated but genuine debate between the logistical priorities of his office and the ideological desires of free speech advocates, Kris Kobach’s tenure has been largely characterized by its silence. After two years in office, Kobach has failed to fulfill a single of the office’s mandatory yearly KORA reports⁶⁷, effectively obfuscating his office’s KORA enforcement from the public view. While Kobach has largely avoided KORA controversy due to his silence on the matter, his history suggests a tension between his office and the nuances of the law. In 2017, Kobach, then stationed as Secretary of State, served on President Donald Trump’s voting fraud commission. In what he argued was an attempt to conserve state resources, Kobach decided to use his private email and attend the commission as a “private citizen”. Critics like Kautsch argue that such a proposition was “obviously totally insane.” and a shrouded attempt to shield his emails from the public record. Nonetheless, Kobach’s office maintained that he served on the Commission in a personal capacity and thus avoided public record scrutiny⁶⁸. In another incident prior to his election as attorney general, Kobach ran afoul of KORA restrictions on disclosure of social security numbers through his attempted solution for dual state voters. In 2017, Kobach implemented a “crosscheck” program which checked voter information against other states’ databases. Upon discovering a Kansas voter named Scott Moore who shared a name with a man in Florida, Kobach sent Moore’s information to Florida officials through unencrypted emails- effectively and publicly disclosing his social security number⁶⁹. Kobach’s silence on KORA as attorney general, in concert with his apparent lack of understanding or respect for its nuances, raise questions about his office's enforcement of Kansas’s presumption of open government.

C. Government Response to Concern Regarding attorney general Enforcement

Under the current KORA model, the government may regulate the attorney general’s enforcement of KORA in two ways, with both coming from the District Court. The Court may regulate overzealous attorney general enforcement of the statute through finding that the office abused their discretion in the initial finding of a violation. Additionally, the Court may field private citizen challenges to the office’s denial of KORA requests and choose to overrule the attorney general’s denial of the request. Absent an abuse of discretion or improper denial by the attorney general, the government grants the attorney general broad freedoms in its enforcement of the KORA and is impotent to regulate administrations that may choose to relax their enforcement of the statute.

ALTERNATIVE OPEN RECORD STATUTES

1.      Introduction

            In light of the controversies and deficiencies plaguing the modern KORA statute, it would not be imprudent to ask, “What’s a legislator to do?”. After all, striking a balance between free speech advocates and the financial realities of government administration, while also ensuring consistency in enforcement across different administrations is nothing short of a herculean task. Conveniently, the challenge of regulating open records across a wide and varied administrative state is not a task that Kansas suffers alone, but rather a nationwide behemoth that has spurned iterations across many jurisdictions. Careful analysis of alternative solutions and their impacts may be instructive on the impacts of each regulatory scheme and help to inform Kansas policy moving forward.

2.      Kansas House Bill 2599

Unsurprisingly, the most relevant alternative scheme for KORA emanates from the great Sunflower state itself. House Bill No. 2599⁷⁰, introduced by the Committee on K-12 education budget in the 2024 session, sought to resolve public concerns with exorbitant fees while balancing the interests of the administrative state in avoiding overbroad and burdensome requests especially from out of state requestors. The bill sought to amend the statutory language of KORA to create greater consistency in its fees and administration.

A.    Legislative History of HB2599

HB 2599’s stint in the legislature lasted no longer than a month in total. First, the bill was introduced in the House on Thursday, January 25th, 2024 by the Committee on Education budget as requested by Representative Thomas⁷¹. On that same day the House referred the bill to the Committee on Judiciary. Twelve days later, the Judiciary Committee heard proponent, neutral, and opponent testimony on the bill. On Monday, February 19th, the Committee submitted a report and  recommended the bill be passed as amended. On Friday, February 23rd 2024, the amendment was stricken from the calendar under rule 1507 for its failure to pass before its deadline day⁷².

B.     Proposed Statutory Changes to KORA

HB 2599 pursued several meaningful statutory changes to attempt to mold KORA to the bill’s will. The bill, as introduced, sought to restrict fee charges to the “actual cost of copying” as opposed to the more relaxed “cost of furnishing” standard that permits the inclusion of pricey staff time and unnecessary administrative costs. Additionally the bill sought to create standardized fees for access by restricting copy fees to no more than $.25 per page, with no fee for digital records. Finally, the bill attempted to resolve concerns on prohibitive fees through the elimination of search fees and restricted charges for employee time to the lowest hourly rate of the qualified employee⁷³. The committee's amendments attempted to address concerns of prohibitive fees and out of state requests through a $100 threshold to charge KORA fees, and a provision permitting full and extensive fees for out of state requestors⁷⁴

C. Potential Fiscal Impact of Proposed Changes to KORA

While the bill never passed the house, the fiscal note rendered in the judiciary committee is instructive on what a revival and implementation of HB2599 could look like⁷⁵ . While other agencies estimated that they would incur greater expenses as a result of the bill’s enactment, two agencies in particular posited a substantial negative fiscal effect under the bill’s reduction of KORA fees: The Kansas Bureau of Investigators and the Office of the attorney general. Specifically, the KBI noted that they would need $136,455 in additional funding to sustain open access to their extensive collection of files and off site processing. The Office of the attorney general estimated that they would need to hire two additional positions estimated at the cost of 400k. Through analysis of each administrative office’s financial needs, the administrative cost of a presumption of open records becomes clear and complicates HB2599’s egalitarian proposals.

3. Missouri Open Records Laws

If Kansas should look to its eastern neighbor for instruction on Open records, it would find a statute that protects its citizens from charges while also allowing for great administrative flexibility in the disclosure of records. The Missouri Open Record Laws strike a unique balance between deference to the public bodies, and preference for a broad policy of open records. Open records in Missouri is governed under two laws: the Sunshine Law and Public records law. The former applies broadly to all meetings, records, and votes creating a similar presumption of availability as the one found in KORA⁷⁶. The latter fills in exceptions found in the Sunshine Law, specifically in instances where the records are kept in accordance with a particular state law⁷⁷.

A. Request process of Missouri Open Records

The Missouri statutes provide for an informal request process that notably features no anticipated wait time for a response upon a record request. Despite this, jilted requestors must prepare to sue their deniers within a year from when the violation became apparent⁷⁸. This feature may be problematic for proponents of free press, who may not receive so much as an estimated date of production in response to their request. In instances where disclosure of a public record is part of a public controversy or developing story, this delay could make a meaningful difference in the press and public information regarding current government events. KORA, by comparison, mandates that extension request letters include the earliest possible date for which the record might be available. Thus, adoption of this provision into the KORA would grant greater flexibility to agencies in their disclosure of records.

C. Fees and Costs of Missouri Open Records

While Missouri requestors have limited claim to a date of return on their request, the requests that are fulfilled are characterized by fairly benevolent fulfillment fees. In Missouri, the agencies have a good faith obligation to minimize the cost, and copying charges may not exceed 10 cents per page, with an hourly fee for service no greater than the average rate of pay for clerical staff ⁷⁹. This amount is substantially smaller than the 25 cents considered under KORA, In addition, the statute’s limitation on the rate of pay ensures that the search is conducted with an emphasis on efficiency. It creates an incentive for Agencies to have clerical staff fulfill simple requests, and limit the time attorneys spend on more costly tasks. KORA charges 25 cents per page and does not restrict its staff wages to that of clerical staff, but rather grants agencies discretion for their charged staff wages. Therefore, adoption of this provision into KORA would dramatically restrict agencies’ discretion in KORA fee charges.

D. Enforcement of Missouri Open Records

Missouri levies hefty fines to ensure compliance with their Open records Laws. Record denials that are found to be in violation of Missouri Law levy hefty fines against the agencies that create them, with a simple violation creating a $1,000 fine⁸⁰ and a purposeful one creating a $5,000 fine and requiring the state to pay the requester's court fees⁸¹. The attorney general may sue public agencies that do not comply with the Missouri Open Records Law, but rarely does so, relying on private citizens to bring their own enforcement.⁸² By comparison, the KORA only allows for a comparatively meager $500 fine in the instance of an attorney general finding of a violation, but sees more active involvement from the office in enforcement of the KORA. Despite inconsistency in enforcement, Missouri’s larger fines assuredly function as an effective deterrent to agencies that seek to arbitrarily deny requested records.

4. Colorado Open Records Act

            If Kansas should look to its more “elevated” counterpart for instruction on Open Records, it would find a state where a true presumption of openness is honored, prompt responses are paramount, and knowing violation of the Public Record law can even bring criminal charges. The Colorado Public Record Law provides that all public records are open for inspection unless another law says that they are not⁸³, and that a public official does not have the authority to deny access to a public record without a specific law permitting the denial⁸⁴. The statutory details of the Colorado Public Record Law gives teeth to this broad promise through meaningful regulation and enforcement.

B. Request process of Colorado Open Records

Under Colorado law, agencies have a duty to respond in three days after fielding a record request, and may request a seven working day extension if extenuating circumstances apply. This timeline is substantially more restrictive than the vague, endless extensions allocated under KORA. In addition, the agency requesting the extension must prove The department must provide “all findings of extenuating to the requester in writing”⁸⁵ creating an additional requirement for transparency even in requesting a mere extension of a record request. Thus, adoption of this provision into the KORA would create a more stringent burden for agencies to promptly comply with KORA requests.

C. Fees and Costs of Colorado Open Records

Colorado law also provides for a few solid protections against prohibitive record request fees.  Advance fees are permitted only if established in writing in advance of the request, and such fees may not exceed $30 per hour (after the first hour free) and $.25 for a standard sized page copying fee.⁸⁶  Through this provision, Colorado creates a presumption of a free hour of search services for any person making a record request. Thus, the adoption of this provision into KORA would empower potential requesters to engage with open government and seek out their desired information.

D. Enforcement of Colorado Open Records

Colorado does not enforce civil sanctions for a violation of their public records law, but knowingly violating the law is a misdemeanor under the state’s criminal law⁸⁷. The attorney general does not occupy an enforcement role in the statute, so civil cases must be brought by requestors, with criminal charges being brought at the discretion of local district attorneys. Kansas does not have a criminal charge for failure to comply with KORA. Thus the adoption of this provision into KORA may grant the statute sharper teeth in its prohibition of hiding records.

5. Oklahoma Open Records Act

            Meanwhile, in tornado alley, Oklahoma’s Public Record statute chases a strict regulation of production fees, and a hefty enforcement mechanism, while remaining cloudy on a consistent expectation for response times. The Oklahoma Open Records Act consists of a series of laws with the express purpose of empowering its citizenry, even extending to personal information granted to the government. The purpose of the section notably states that, except as outlined in the law’s exceptions, citizens have no expectation of privacy in information that they choose to share with public agencies.⁸⁸ This broad sweeping availability is reflected in the Oklahoma statute, characterized by minimum fees and intense enforcement mechanisms.

A. Request Process of Oklahoma Open Records

Oklahoma’s Public Record response time is by far the most agency friendly component of its law. While many states require a response within a specific time frame at the least, Oklahoma’s statute requires only that the public bodies “ provide prompt, reasonable access to its records”⁸⁹. This becomes problematic due to the lack of clear definition on what constitutes a “prompt” response. This question has been deferred to the Court with the only clear ruling providing that a 17 month delay was not prompt⁹⁰. Responses within a 17 month timeframe, therefore, are still unclear as to whether they would constitute a prompt response. The lack of specificity in the statute complicates enforcement because agencies cannot anticipate the expectations they seek to fulfill. If KORA were to incorporate similar language, agencies would undoubtedly use their new found discretion to further delay request fulfillment, to the dismay of avid requestors.

B. Fees and Costs of Oklahoma Open Records

            Oklahoma’s regulation of production fees for documents sought under its public record laws, by comparison, spare no expense in outlining in great detail the instances where agencies may charge limited fees, if any at all. Generally, a public body may only charge the direct costs of copying- at no more than 25 cents per page⁹¹. Courts get their own special surcharge with $1 for the first page, and 50 cents for each following page⁹². A public body may exceed these limitations and recover the direct cost of any document search when the request would cause excess disruption to the public body’s essential functions⁹³. Search fees may include the storage media used, any access or processing charges imputed by the request, any hardware specifically required to fulfill the request, and the cost of labor directly related to fulfillment of the request⁹⁴. In a final blow to prohibitive fee setting, any agency officer found to have set fees to discourage a request may be sued in civil court by a private citizen, or prosecuted in criminal court by the district attorney⁹⁵. This fee schedule provides a presumption of cheap access to open government, especially amongst members of the press. Thus, if KORA were to incorporate similar language into its fee schedule, proponents of journalistic entities would be overjoyed at their newfound access, and likely create more requests for agencies to fulfill.

C.    Enforcement of Oklahoma Open Records

            Any person denied access to records under the Oklahoma Law may sue the agency in civil court to mandate disclosure of the denied records⁹⁶.  Any willful violation of the Oklahoma Public Records law could lead to criminal prosecution by the district attorney’s office⁹⁷. Unlike Kansas, the attorney general is not involved in interpreting either claim, and those looking to sue take their claims straight to the local court, or must petition their local district attorney for enforcement of the criminal penalty. Thus, adaptation of this provision into KORA would further incentivize compliance amongst agencies, for fear of harsher penalties.

6. Nebraska Public Records Law

Nebraska’s Open Record statute strikes a fine balance between punitive enforcement, and allowances for administrative delay and extra fees. The law, like KORA, allows for a broad presumption of free and open records subject to exceptions. Unlike KORA, Nebraska’s exceptions are not kept within the Open Record statute, but spread throughout the laws.

A. Request Process of Nebraska Open Records

            Nebraska Law requires that record requests are responded to as soon as possible, but no later than 4 business days after the agency receives the request. Extensions may be granted for requests that may not be fulfilled in good faith within the request time⁹⁸, provided that the agency, within the time period, identifies the earliest possible date they may secure the copies. This regulation is functionally identical to the one provided by KORA with an additional day for the initial response, and thus adoption of this language would grant slightly more flexibility to agencies in their response.

B. Fees and Costs of Nebraska Open Records

In Nebraska, public bodies may only charge the actual cost of reproducing, and must waive the copying fee if the requestor brings their own printer⁹⁹. Like KORA, the cost of copying may not be greater than $.25 per page¹⁰⁰. Additional charges for wages of employees who search for the records must exclude the first four hours of employee time from their calculations¹⁰¹. Through these regulations, the Nebraska law allows for requesters to reduce their own burden, while also providing a presumptive four hours of cost free service in the name of free and open government. If this language was adapted into KORA, public agencies would shoulder a larger administrative burden in restructuring to facilitate four hours of free service per new request. Absent funding, such a proposition would create an enormous strain on the resources and bandwidth of public agencies.

D. Enforcement Mechanism of Nebraska Open Records

Nebraska’s enforcement of Open Records largely reflects KORA’s similar mechanisms. Jilted requestors may either directly sue the public body in court, or petition the attorney general to sue the public body on their behalf.¹⁰² When a jilted requestor directly sues a public body, the court may grant them attorney’s fees, if the requestor has “substantially prevailed”¹⁰³. Unlike the KORA, a public officials’ violation of Nebraska’s Open Records statute may create criminal penalties and even cause the officials who violated them to be removed or impeached¹⁰⁴.

ENDNOTES

1.  Paul Blumenthal, 3-23-2010, "The History of Transparency — Part 1: Opening the Channels of Information to the People in the 18th Century", Sunlight Foundation

2.  Yvonne Wingett, 9-24-2024, "Latest strategy in fighting election skepticism: Radical transparency", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/09/24/election-transparency-voter-fraud-pinal-county-arizona/

3. 10-30-2020, "Governor Kelly Takes Significant Steps for Transparency, Announces New SPARK Taskforce Public Dashboard", Governor of the State of Kansas, https://governor.kansas.gov/governor-kelly-takes-significant-steps-for-transparency-announces-new-spark-taskforce-public-dashboard/

4.  John Hanna, 3-25-2024, "In the Kansas House, when lobbyists ask for new laws, their names go on the bills", AP News, https://apnews.com/article/open-government-transparency-kansas-legislature-b83e78750eb404139a64bdb557341821

5.  K.S.A 45-216(a) As cited in Kautsch (2023)

6.  Maxwell Kautsch, 1-19-23, “Open Government Guide” Reporters Committee. https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/kansas-2/#open-government-guide

7.  K.S.A. 45-217 As cited in Kautsch (2023)

8.  State, Dep’t. of Social and Rehab. Servs. v. Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 815 P.2d 66, 72, 249 Kan. 163, 170 (1991). As cited in Kautsch (2023)

9.  K.S.A. 45-222, 251

10.  Kautsch (2023)

11.  Kautsch (2023)

12.  K.S.A. 45-217(f)

13.  Ted Frederickson, Letting the Sunshine In, 33 Kan. L. Rev. 205, 221 (Winter 1985).as cited in Kautsch (2023)

14.  Ibid.

15.  Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 96-77.as cited in Kautsch (2023)

16.  K.S.A. 45-217(f)(1). As cited in Kautsch (2023)

17.  State v. Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc., Opinion No. 115932, HN. 2 (Kan. 2018). As cited in Kautsch (2023)

18.  Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 2004-34 as cited in Kautsch (2023)

19.  "Senate Bill No 361”, Leg. 2016, (2016). https://www.kslegislature.gov/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/hb2256_enrolled.pdf

20.  Ibid.

21.  K.S.A. 45-217(g)(1).

22.   Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 93-126. As cited in Kautsch (2023)

23.  Senate Bill SB 361 (2016)

24.  2021 FY KORA KOMA REPORT, Kansas attorney general

25.  Kautsch (2013)

26.  K.S.A. 45-215, et. seq.

27.  Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 1983-112.

28.  K.S.A. 45-222(a)

29.  K.S.A. 60-512(2)

30.  K.S.A. 45-222(c)

31.  Kautsch (2023)

32.   House Bill HB 2256 (2015) Kan. Leg. https://www.kslegislature.gov/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/summary_hb_2256_2015.pdf

33.  K.S.A. 45-403

34.  Kautsch (2023)

35.  K.S.A. 45-219(c)(1).

36.  K.S.A. 45-219(c)(2)

37.  K.S.A. 45-219(c)(5).

38.  K.S.A. 45-219(c)(1)

39.  K.S.A. 45-218(f)

40.  Proponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Rachel Schrag Sommerfeld)

41.  Proponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Emily Bradbury and Allison Mazzei)

42.  Proponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Debbie Detmer)

43.  Proponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Jill O’Conner)

44.  Proponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Missy Leavitt)

45.  Neutral Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Thad Snider)

46.  K.S.A. 45-219(c)(2)

47.  Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 95-64.

48.  Kansas Department of Administration, (2022) Policy and Procedure for Obtaining Copies of or Access to Public Records Pursuant to the Kansas Open Records Act, https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/publications/kansas-attorney-general%27s-record-request-policy.pdf?sfvrsn=790b1a89_12

49.  K.S.A. 45-218(d).

50.  K.S.A. 45-227

51.  K.S.A. 45-218(e)

52.  K.S.A. 45-222(c)

53.  Neutral Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Clayton Barker)

54.  Opponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Jay Hall)

55.  Opponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Amanda Stanley)

56.  Opponent Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 6th, 2024, Before the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary, Leg. 2024, (2024) (Statement of Michael Koss, Statement of Dick Carter)

57.  "Special Testimony submitted to the Kansas Legislature on February 3rd, 2023, Before the Kansas Committee on General Government Budget, Leg. 2023, (2023) (Statement of Kris W. Kobach)" https://www.kslegislature.gov/li/b2023_24/committees/ctte_h_gen_govt_bdgt_1/misc_documents/download_testimony/ctte_h_gen_govt_bdgt_1_20230203_04_testimony.html

58.  "Supplemental Note on Senate Bill No. 415”, As Amended by House Committee on Judiciary t, Leg. 2016, (2016) https://kslegislature.gov/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/supp_note_sb415_01_0000.pdf#:~:text=

59.  House Bill 2256, Kan. Leg,  2015 https://www.kslegislature.gov/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/hb2256_enrolled.pdf

60.  K.S.A. 45-251(a)(1)(A)(ii).

61.  K.S.A. 45-251(c)(4)(B).

62.  K.S.A. 45-251(c)(4)

63.  Tomari Quinn, 11-25-2017, "Tomari Quinn: A.G.’s office falls short on open records effort", Topeka Capital-Journal, https://www.cjonline.com/story/news/politics/state/2017/11/25/tomari-quinn-ag-s-office-falls-short-open-records-effort/16519301007/

64. K.S.A. 45-218(d)

65.  Max Kautsch, 9-10-2022, "Kansas AG’s office enforces open records law while overlooking key piece • Kansas Reflector", Kansas Reflector, https://kansasreflector.com/2022/09/15/kansas-ags-office-enforces-open-records-law-while-overlooking-key-piece/

66.  Max Kautsch, 9-10-2022, "attorney general’s Office ignores plain text of Kansas open records law, sets poor example • Kansas Reflector", Kansas Reflector, https://kansasreflector.com/2022/09/14/attorney-generals-office-ignores-plain-text-of-kansas-open-records-law-sets-poor-example/

67.  Jack Harvel, 7-1-2021, "Kansas AG Kobach hasn't finished mandatory open government report in 17 months", https://www.cjonline.com/story/news/politics/state/2024/08/19/kansas-ags-office-hasnt-finished-required-annual-report-in-17-months-kris-kobach/74796060007/

68.  Bryan Lowry, 9-18-2017, "Is Kobach a private citizen on Trump commission? Question will test transparency law", Kansas City Star, https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article173996136.html

69.  ACLU of Kansas, 6-19-2018, "Moore v. Schwab (previously Moore v. Kobach)", ACLU of Kansas, https://www.aclukansas.org/en/cases/moore-v-schwab-previously-moore-v-kobach

70.  House Bill 2599, Kan. Leg,  2024 https://www.kslegislature.gov/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/hb2256_enrolled.pdf

71.  House Bill 2599, Kan. Leg,  2024 https://www.kslegislature.gov/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/hb2256_enrolled.pdf

72.  Kan. Leg., (2024), "HB 2599", https://www.kslegislature.gov/li/b2023_24/measures/hb2599/

73.  Id.

74.  House Bill 2599 as Amended by House Committee, Kan. Leg,  2024 https://www.kslegislature.gov/li/b2023_24/measures/documents/hb2599_01_0000.pdf

75.  Supplemental Note on House Bill No. 2599 as Amended by House Committee on Judiciary , Kan. Leg,  2024 https://www.kslegislature.gov/li/b2023_24/measures/documents/supp_note_hb2599_01_0000.pdf

76.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.010-.035

77.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 109.180

78.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.027.5.

79.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.026.1(2)

80.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.027.3

81.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.027.4

82.  Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.027.1)

83.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-201

84.  Denver Publ'g Co. v. Dreyfus, 184 Colo. 288, 520 P.2d 104 (1974).

85.  Colo. Rev. State S 24‐ 72‐203(3)(b), C.R.S

86.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-205(1), (5)(a) (2007)

87.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-309

88.  O.S. title 51, sections 24A.1

89.  51 O.S. § 24A.5(6)

90.   Branstetter v. Fallin, CV-2014-2372, OSCN, Court Letter Ruling at *3 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cnty. Apr. 13, 2018), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4438896/Judge-Davis-Letter-Ruling-1.pdf

91.  51 O.S. § 24A.5(4)

92.   2009 OK AG 27

93.  51 O.S.§ 24A

94.  2005 OK AG 21.

95.  51 O.S. §§ 24A.5(4), 24A.17(A)

96.  51 O.S. § 24A(17)(B)(1)

97.  51 O.S. § 24A(17)(B)(1)

98.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712(4)

99.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.01(2).

100.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.02

101.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.02.

102.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.03

103.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.07

104.  Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.09.